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NEBLETT V. STATE BAR.

[17 C. (2d)

ing arose. It is true that the particular defendant was early
relieved of liability in that action on an order of dismissal
and his representation by the challenged member of the Board
of Governors was but nominal. It is also true that in response to petitioner's motion to dismiss this proceeding because of said member's alleged disqualification and the asserted resulting deficient vote of qualified members of the
Board of Governors, an affidavit has been filed herein by the
challenged member in which he avers that at the time of his
participation in the deliberations and voting of the board
in this disciplinary proceeding he had "completely forgotten" his prior and nominal representation of one of the minor
defendants in the libel action. He likewise disclaimed all
"feeling favorable or unfavorable" toward petitioner by reason thereof. We do not question the sincerity or honesty of
purpose of the. particular member. Nor do we find it necessary to here pass upon either the timeliness or the merits of
the challenge directed at him, for obviously our conclusion to
dismiss this proceeding without prejudice for reasons already
mentioned will effectively serve to remove the circumstance
which petitioner asserts has resulted in the recommendation
of his disbarment by a vote of an insufficient number of qualified members of the Board of Governors. This latter circumstance is but another factor tending to establish the reasonableness of our disposition of this proceeding in a manner to
eliminate all vestige of claimed unfairness.
In conclusion, it may also be pointed out that such course
will likewise serve to afford petitioner the requested opportunity to further challenge the testimony of the president of
The Newberry Electric Corporation. The respondent State
Bar denied a similar request upon the ground that it already
had made its recommendation to this court and had lost jurisdiction of the proceeding. It appears from the findings herein
that the respondent State Bar has placed much reliance upon
the testimony of said witness particularly in so far as it differs
from petitioner's explanation of his dealings with that company. In a supplemental affidavit filed in support of his
motion to dismiss this proceeding upon the ground last above
discussed, the petitioner avers that in the argument before
the Board of Governors the State Bar examiner had cast some
aspersion upon or had questioned the accuracy of at least a
portion of the testimony of the designated witness, who had
been called by. the respondent. We do not find in the record
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now before us any denial by the State Bar of such challenge
of its own witness and, as stated, our indicated disposal of
this proceeding will not foreclose the petitioner from further
challenging the witness' testimony in any particular desired.
Therefore, in view of the pendency of the libel action out
of which this proceeding arose, and in view of the unsatisfactory state of the record herein in the respects mentioned,
we are of the opinion that the ends of justice will best be
served and the valuable right to practice law will more effectively be guarded by a dismissal of this proceeding without
prejudice, to await whatever proceedings the respondent
State Bar deems appropriate upon the later determination of
the libel litigation.
It is so ordered.
Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
A petition for a rehearing and for modification was denied
February 20, 1941. Edmonds, J., and Houser, J., did not
participate.
!!

[L. A. No. 16070.

In Bank.-January 27, 1941.]

FEWEL & DAWES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v.
FRANKLIN L. PRATT, Appellant.
[1] Appeal and Error-Review-Questions of Law and Fact-Insufficiency of Evidence Generally-Sufficiency of Evidence to
Support Findings - Findings upon Con:fiicting EvidenceWhere There is Sufficient or Substantial Evidence.-A finding
of the trial court upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of a substantial character which reasonably supports it. But a finding may be
set aside where the evidence in support thereof is so slight
and tenuous that it does not create a real and substantial
coniiict.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Appeal and Error, §§ 1280, 12134;
2. Corporations, § 730; 3. Contracts, § 76; 4. Licenses, § 58;
5. Novation, § 2; 6. Contracts, § 74; 7. Contracts, § 82; 8. Appeal and Error, § 1089.
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[170. (2d)
[8] Appeal and Error-Review-Persons Entitled to Allege Errors

[2] Corporations-Powers, Punctions and Liabilities-ContractsContracts Before Incorporation-Evidence.-A finding that a
person was acting on behalf of a corporation to be formed
in making an agreement with the defendant cannot be sustained where (a) the written memorandum of the contract
made no reference to the corporation, (b) the defendant
repeatedly insisted that he would not deal with such person's associates, and (c) the assignment of the contract to
the corporation by such party states the contract to be
between himself and the defendant as individuals. This
is true despite an ambiguous statement of the defendant in
the course of their negotiations that he did not want to do
business with the corporation, but would do business through
it with such party, and of the party's statement that he could
not work without his associates. (Three judges dissenting.)
[3] Contracts-Legality-Effect of Illegality-Enforceability Generally.-A contract which requires the performance of unlawful acts is unenforceable. (See Civ. Code, secs. 1608,
1667.)
[4] Licenses-License of Occupations-Nonpayment as Affecting
Contracts-In General-Contract to Divide Insurance Commissions.-A' person not licensed to act as an insurance broker
or agent cannot enforce a contract between himself and a licensed broker to divide commissions on insurance business.
[5] Novation-Introductory":-'Requisites Generally.-No novation
is effected by an assignment by a party to a contract with
an insurance broker with reference to the division of commissions on certain insurance, where the assignment is merely
a transfer of the right to receive payments of money in return for a valuable consideration, and there is no assumption
of obligations by the assignee.
[6] Contracts-Legality-Effect of Illegality-In General-Ratification.-An illegal contract cannot be ratified, and no person
can be estopped from denying its validity. And so a party
to a contract is not estopped from denying its validity because of his acceptance of receipts in the name of another to
conceal the illegality of the transaction.
[7] Id.-LegalitY-Effect of Illegality-Pleading Illegality.-An
appellate court may refuse to enforce a contract that is
illegal as a matter of law regardless of the pleadings of the
parties.
4. Failure of broker to procure license as affecting validity
or enforceability of contracts, notes, 30 A. L. R. 852; 42 A. L. R.
1228; U8 A. L. R. 647. See, also, 4 Cal. Jur. 552, 613; 8 Am.
Jur. 997, 1076; 29 Am. Jur. 134; 4 R. C. L. 246, 301.

"

-Waiver of Right to Urge Error.-A party defendant is not
precluded from raising on appeal the question of illegality
of the contract sued on where he denied liability under the
contract in his answer and introduced evidence showing the
illegality, where he moved to vacate the judgment and have
judgment entered in his favor on this ground, and where he
urged the question on appeal as ground for reversal.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. J. A. Smith and Ruben S. Schmidt, Judges.
Reversed.
Hugh Ward Lutz for Appellant.
Hulen C. Callaway and Joe Crail, Jr., for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-The appellant, l!'ranklin L. Pratt, a licensed life insurance broker, had written several policies of
life insurance for John G. Bullock of Los Angeles. In 1928
Bullock decided to take out additional life insurance amounting to $150,000 under an arrangement that would enable his
son-in-law, Richard W. Fewel, to receive half of the commissions. Fewel was in debt to Bullock, and the latter wanted
him to earn a share of the commissions so that he could
meet his obligations. On July 10, 1928, Pratt and Fewel
met in Bullock's office to make arrangements for working
together. Pratt refused to work with Fewel's associates and
insisted that the agreement. be with Fewel alone. Fewel
maintained that he could not work without his associates.
When they finally agreed to work together and to divide
the commissions so earned, they went to the office of Pratt
who executed the following writing:
"July 10, 1928
"Mr. Richard W. Fewel,
,
"716 South Spring St.,
"Los Angeles.
"Dear Mr. Fewel:
"This is to confirm our verbal understanding of this date
that we will work together in the purchase of insurance for
Mr. John G. Bullock, on the basis of an equal division of the
commissions.
"Very truly yours,
"F. L. P."
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Fewel accepted this writing as embodying the terms of the
agreement and there is no question as to its authenticity.
Neither at that time nor since was Fewel licensed as
an insurance broker or agent. At the time of the agreement, however, he was planning to organize a corporation
to carryon an insurance business. His plans materialized
with the incorporation of Moore, Fewel & Company on July
30, 1928, which was duly licensed as an insurance broker
on August 10, 1928. On September 1, 1928, Fewel, an officer
and director of this company, assigned to it his interest in
the agreement with Pratt. The company subsequently assigned its rights under the contract to its successor, Moore,
Fewel & Devlin, Inc., which in turn assigned them to Moore,
Fewel & Dawes. The latter subsequently changed its name
to Fewel & Dawes, respondent herein. Richard W. Fewel
has been at all times an officer of these corporations.
None of the life insurance policies contemplated by this
agreement was secured until 1930. In 1930, 1931, and 1932,
Pratt wrote various life insurance policies for Bullock with
the cooperation of Fewel. On July 31, 1930, Pratt and Fewel
made their first division of commissions. Pratt objected that
the payment of commissions to Fewel would be illegal because the latter had no license. It was therefore agreed that
Fewel should issue a receipt signed" Moore, Fewel & Devlin
by Richard W. Fewel" to enable Pratt to show a legal transaction on his books. Pratt made out his check for the commissions to Fewel personally. Fewel deposited the check in
his private account which he alone used. Other commissions
were subsequently divided in the same manner, the last division being made on February 19, 1931. On September 15,
1933, John G. Bullock died. On December 15, 1935, Fewel &
Dawes, the last assignee of Fewel's right to commissions under the agreement with Pratt, brought suit against Pratt
for unpaid commissions. The trial court gave judgment for
plaintiff, and defendant Pratt has appealed.
The trial court found that Fewel was acting on behalf of the
corporation Moore, Fewel & Company in making the agreement with Pratt. There is, however, no substantial evidence
that Pratt agreed to contract with an actual or contemplated
corporation rather than with Fewel. Plaintiff has failed to
sustain the burden of proving that Pratt gave the assent
necessary to the completion of such a contract. On the contrary/ it is undisputed that Pratt repeatedly insisted he would
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not work with Fewel's associates and would enter into a
contract only with Fewel individually. Fewel's statement
that he could not work without his associates in no way establishes that Pratt contracted with Fewel and his associates as a corporation. The question is not how Fewel intended to carryon his business, but who were the parties
to the contract. Fewel's statement could not make the corporation a party to the contract without Pratt's agreement.
The terms of the contract set forth in the memorandum written by Pratt and accepted by Fewel make no mention of a
corporation as party to the contract. They clearly indicate
the contract to be between Pratt and Fewel as individuals.
[1] A finding of the trial court upon conflicting evidenCl)
will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of a
substantial character which reasonably supports the judgment. (Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. (2d) 409 [71 Pac.
(2d) 220]; Reese v. Smith, 9 Cal. (2d) 324 [70 Pac. (2d)
933]; Tobias v. Adams, 201 Cal. 689 [258 Pac. 588]; Lefrooth v. Prentice, 202 Cal. 215 [259 Pac. 947] ; Thoreau v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal. App. 67 [7 Pac.
(2d) 767] ; Gamberg v. Industrial Accident Com'mission, 138
Cal. App. 424 [32 Pac. (2d) 413] ; Gardiner v. Holcomb, 82
Cal. App. 342 [255 Pac. 523]; Houghton v. Loma Prieta
Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 574 [93 Pac. 377] ; Field v. Shorb, 99
Cal. 661 [34 Pac. 504] ; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal. App.
119 [180 Pac. 67]; White v. Greenwood, 52 Oal. App. 737
[199 Pac. 1095]; Elliott v. Market St,reet Ry. Co., 4 Cal.
App. (2d) 292 [40 Pac. (2d) 547].) If, however, the evidence is so slight and tenuous that it does not create a
real and substantial conflict the finding may be set aside.
(Ibid.) "There must be more than a conflict of words to
constitute a conflict of evidence. The contrary evidence must
be of a substantial character, such as reasonably supports
the judgment. . . . " (Herbert v. LankersMm, supra.)
[2] In the present case the only evidence in the entire
record which tends to indicate that Pratt agreed to contract
with Fewel on behalf of the corporation is the following
statement by Fewel: "He said 'I don't want to do business
with the corporation, but I will do business through your
corporation with you.' " This statement, in itself contradictory and ambiguous, appears in the course of testimony
by Fewel that Pratt insisted he would not do business witb
the corporation but only' with Fewel personally. Nowhere
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in Fewel's testimony is there an unequivocal statement that
Pratt agreed to contract with the corporation or with Fewel
on behalf of the corporation. Against his ambiguous statement there stands not merely his other statements that Pratt
would not do business with the corporation, and Pratt's testimony that he contracted with Fewel personally and not
with the corporation; there stands also the written memorandum embodying the terms of the agreement, which makes
no reference to the corporation but clearly states the contract to be between Pratt and Fewel as individuals, as well
as the written assignment to the corporation in which Fewel
openly refers to the contract as being between Pratt and
himself. In this context Fewel's statement does not constitute evidence substantial enough to support the finding
of the trial court.
[3, 4] It is well established in California that a contract
which requires the performance of unlawful acts is unenforceable. (Civ. Code, secs. 1608, 1667; LevinsQn v. Boas, 150
Cal. 185 [88 Pac. 825, 11, Ann. Cas. 661, 12 L. R. .A. (N. S.)
575]; La Rosa v. Glaze, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 354 [63 Pac.
(2d) 1181].) Former section 633aa of the California Political Code (now Insurance Code, sec. 1714) provided: "Any
person who shall act or offer to act or assume to act as a
life insurance broker or agent, unless licensed by the insurance commissioner as provided in this section . . . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor." On the facts presented, the contract under consideration was between Pratt and Fewel as
an individual. Since Fewel was at no time licensed as an
insurance broker or agent, he could not legally solicit insurance or receive commissions; therefore, neither he nor his
assign.ees can enforce the contract. It is true that an unlicensed person is not precluded from recovering a commission if he secures such license by the time the contract is
performed, although it was executed prior to the time he
was licensed. (Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 267 [200
Pac. 55] ; Radich v. Oernokus, 65 Cal. App. 452 [224 Pac.
124] ; Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal. App. 414 [262 Pac. 400].)
In the present situation, however, Fewel not only had no
license at the time he entered into the contract, but never
acquired one thereafter. All the acts which he performed
under the contract were illegal and can therefore give rise
to no enforceable obligation.
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[5] The subsequent assignment by Fewel to the corporation of his right to receive payments under the contract in
no way purported to substitute the corporation in Fewel's
stead as a party to the original agreement, nor did the assignee-corporation undertake to perform any of the duties
under the agreement. The assignment read:
"Know all men by these presents: That I, Richard W.
Fewel, of Los Angeles, California, for a valuable consideration, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby
sell, assign, transfer and set over unto Moore, Fewel & Company its successors and assigns, all my right, title and interest in and to any and all commissions and renewal commissions for life insurance policies written on the life of
John G. Bullock and accruing to me under and by virtue
of an agreement between Franklin L. Pratt and myself, providing for the payment of one-half of said commissions to me.
September 1,1928.
" (Signed) RICHARD W. FEWEL."
The wording of the assignment clearly indicates that Fewel
was merely transferring to the corporation the right to receive payments of money in return for a valuable consideration. There is no assumption of obligations by the corporation. There is no novation effected whereby the corporation
steps into Fewel's shoes as obligor under the contract. The
obligations of the agreement remained with Fewel; he performed them, and it was his performance of them without
a license which rendered the contract illegal.
The assignment clearly states that the contract was between
Fewel as an individual and Pratt. No assignment of rights
would have been necessary had Fewel made the contract on
behalf of the corporation, for the latter could then simply
have adopted the contract as its own. (Ballantine, Private
Corporations, sec. 47.)
[6] Pratt is not estopped from denying the validity of
his contract with Fewel because he accepted receipts from
Fewel in the name of the corporation to conceal the illegality
of the transaction. An illegal contract cannot be ratified,
and no person can be estopped from denying its validity.
(Oolby v. Title Ins. db Tr. 00., 160 Cal. 632 [117 Pac. 913,
Ann. Cas. 1913A, 515, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 813]; Reno v.
American Ice Machine 00., 72 Cal. App. 409 [237 Pac. 784] ;
Wood v. Impericil Irr. Dist., 216 Cal. 748 [17 Pac. (2d)
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128] ; Regan v. Albin, 219 Cal. 357 [26 Pac. (2d) 475];
A. L. I. Restatement, Contracts, sees. 590, 598.)
[7, 8] Defendant in his answer denied any liability under
the contract. He introduced evidence at the trial showing that
Fewel was at no time a licensed agent or broker. He moved
in the trial court to vacate the judgment and to have judgment entered in his favor on the ground that the contract
was illegal and hence unenforceable. In his brief on appeal
he urged the illegality of the contract as grounds for reversal.
'l'here is therefore no basis for precluding him from raiGing
the question of illegality on appeal. If the contract is illegal as a matter of law, this court may refuse to enforc.:e it
regardless of the pleadings of the parties. (Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727 [203 Pac. 760] ; Pacific Wharf etc. Co. v.
Standard Am. Dredging Co;, 184 Cal. 21 [192 Pac. 847];
Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721 [16 Pac. (2d) 673];
Kreamer v. Earl, 91 Cal. 112 [27 Pac. 735] ; Dean v. McNerney, 91 Cal. App. 206 [266 Pac. 975] ; 6 Cal. Jur. 162; 4 Cal.
Jur. Supp. 71, 72.)
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Edmonds, J., Gibson, 0.. J., and Houser, J., concurred.
~~

CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached in the opinion
prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor for the reason that it is
predicated upon an incorrect statement of the facts of this
case as they appear in the record and as found by the trial
court, and the rules of law relied upon in said opinion are
not applicable to the factual situation as disclosed by the
record and determined by the findings of the trial court.
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed with the
modifications hereinafter mentioned.
As a correct understanding of the facts is essential to the
solution of every legal problem, I will state the facts of this
case as they appear in the record and as f~und by the trial
court. They are as follows:
During the early part of the year 1928, Richard W. Fewel
was a partner in an insurance brokerage firm known as
"Universal Underwriters." Fewel was married to John G.
Bullock's daughter. Pratt approached Fewel around the
10th day of July, 1928, and suggested that between the two
of them they could sell Bullock some additional life insur-
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ance. Thereupon, Pratt gave Fewel a letter of that date
agreeing to an equal division of commissions on such insurance as was purchased by Bullock. Fewel at the time was
planning the organization of a new corporation to take over
his insurance business. The organization of the corporation
was completed July 25, 1928, under the corporate name of
Moore, Fewel & Company. On September 1, 1928, Richard
W. Fewel assigned the contract with Pratt covering the Bullock life insurance commissions to Moore, Fewel & Company,
of which he was then an officer and stockholder. Moore,
Fewel & Company were duly licensed as insurance brokers
on August 10, 1928. The first policy of life insurance written for John G. Bullock was several months after August 10,
1928. Thereafter, Moore, Fewel & Company assigned the
Pratt agreement to Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., Ltd. (when
a new corporation was formed to take in another partner),
and Moore, Fewel & Devlin in turn assigned it to Moore,
Fewel & Dawes. Moore, Fewel & Dawes changed its corporate name to Fewel & Dawes, Inc., the respondent herein.
At all times prior to their respective assignments Richard W.
Fewel was an officer of the aforesaid corporations.
Fewel informed Pratt at the time the contract was made
of his intention to organize a new corporation to take over
his insurance business and that the Bullock life insurance
would be handled through the new company, although it
would have his personal attention.
During the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, considerable insurance was written on the life of John G. Bullock, resulting in
the collection by the defendant Pratt of commissions amounting to $23,074.29. It was part of the arrangement between
the parties that Pratt would keep the records, collect the
premiums and account to the plaintiff and its assignors
for the commissions.
John G. Bullock died September 15, 1933. Prior to his
death Bullock was unable to pay all the premiums on a large
amount of life insurance purchased through Pratt and the
respondent's assignors after the agreement was entered into.
An arrangement was made between Pratt and the respondent's assignors whereby certain portions of the commissions
earned would bE; advanr,ed to Bullock and used in keeping
the insurance in force.
At the time of Bullock's death there was $4,150.83 due
Pratt and the respondent on account of the advances so made,
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for which Pratt filed a claim against the Bullock estate.
This claim was approved and ordered paid by the probate
(~ourt on December 12, 1935, the same date this action was
instituted.
Prior thereto Pratt D;lade a division of commissions, and
the sum of $2,687.75 was paid to respondent's assignors and
receipted therefor by Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., Ltd., to
Pratt. No other amount was ever paid to the respondent,
'or its assignors. Pratt was not required to account for the
commissions prior to Bullock's death for the reason that
Fewel knew a large portion thereof was being advanced back
to Bullock in order to enable him to pay premiums. After
Bullock's death and up to the time of institution of the action Pratt refused to a.ccount for the reason, among others,
that all of the commissions had not been collected.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found "that
the contract was made by Richard W. Fewel as an officer
and agent of Moore, Fewel & Company and was subsequently
performed by him as an officer and agent of the other corporations owning it under the respective assignments."
The trial court further found "that at all times during
the performance of the contract the respondent and its corporate predecessors in title thereto were duly licensed insurance brokers and entitled to one-half of the commissions
derived from insurance written on the life of John G. Bullock after the date of the contract; that an accounting was
had in open court wherein it was determined that the gross
amount of commissions was $23,074.29; and that after crediting the amounts theretofore paid by Pratt to respondent's
assignor, there was due the plaintiff herein from Pratt the
sum of $8,849.39 as its share of said commissions." The
court found against the appellant Pratt on all of his defenses.
The trial court further found "that the appellant Pratt
ratified the assignment of the agreement by accepting receipts
from a subsequent assignee, Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc.,
Ltd."
Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for the sum
of $8,849.39, with interest in addition thereto amounting to
$1993.30.
The first attempt by the defendant to assert the illegality
of the agreement of July 10, 1928, was on a motion to vacate
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the judgment and to have a judgment entered in his favor.
In support of such motion, the defendant contended that the
agreement of July 10, 1928, was contrary to express statute
and void for the reason that Fewel was not at that time a
duly licensed and authorized insurance broker. This motion was denied by the trial court and defendant appealed.
It is not true as stated in the majority opinion that:
"There is no substantial evidence that Pratt agreed tQ
contract with an actual or contemplated corporation rather
than with Fewel. Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden
of proving that Pratt gave the assent necessary to the completion of such a contract. On the contrary, it is undisputed that Pratt repeatedly insisted he would not work with
Fewel's associates and would enter into a contract only with
Fewel individually. Fewel's statement that he could not
work without his associates in no way establishes that Pratt
contracted with Fewel and his associates as a corporation."
In making the foregoing statement, the author of the majority opinion has disregarded the findings of the trial court
which found the facts directly in conflict with said statement. These findings are supported by substantial evidence
in the form of testimony of witnesses and inferences which
the trial court was justified in drawing from the testimony
and conduct of the parties.
So that there will be no question as to the testimony upon
which the foregoing statement is based, I will quote the
testimony of the witnesses verbatim. Fewel testified as Tvllows:
"A. I will say this-that I was authorized at all time!'! to
negotiate with Mr. Bullock and Mr. Pratt, from the very
inception they knew I was handling it; that Mr. Pratt didn't
want anything to do with Mr. Moore, and I told him so;
he told me he did not care to do business with Mr. Moore,
he wanted to do business with me; that I was Mr. Bullock's
son-in-law; he said, 'I don't want to do business with the
corporation, but I will do business through your corporation
with you.' I said, 'All right.'
"A. No, he said he didn't want to do business with Mr.
Moore and my associates; that he didn't care if the corporation or my company or my associates participated, but he
wanted the contract with me; that I was Mr. Bullock's sonin-law and he did not see any reason whatever for them to
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come into the picture. I explained to him on the first matter, as I told you before, I told him that I was associated

with these people, and whatever I did I did it with them."
Defendant Pratt testified:
"I told Mr. Bullock, in Mr. Fewel's presence, that I
couldn't legally do what we had agreed to do, but that I
didn't want to be the beneficiary of that inability to do a
thing I had contracted to do in good faith and that I would
give any broker or anyone qualified legally to receive the
commissions the amount involved. Q. -So therefore you
paid it to Moore, F'ewel & Devlin? A. -Mr. F'ewel said that
if I would give the commissions to Moore, F'ewel & Dev-,
lin he would arrange to see that he got the credit over there.
Q. -Well, was that agreeable to you? A. Yes, so far as
giving away commissions is agreeable."
As I read the foregoing testimony I am forced to the conclusion that the trial court was justified in concluding as
it did conclude that Fewel advised Pratt that the agreement
between them was to be performed by Fewel and his associates who were later organized into a corporation which immediately became licensed as an insurance broker; that Pratt
dealt with said corporation by paying to it one-half of the
premiums which he collected on insurance policies written
for Bullock; that Pratt thereby ratified the assignment of
said agreement from Fewel to the corporation and by Moore,
Fewel & Company, a corporation, to its successors in interest.
The majority opinion also states that "It was therefore
agreed that Fewel should issue a receipt signed 'Moore, Fewel
. & Devlin by Richard W. Fewel' to enable Pratt to show a
legal transaction on his books. Pratt made out his check
for the commissions to Fewel personally. Fewel deposited
, the check in his private account which he alone used. Other
commissions were subsequently divided in the same manner,
the last division being made on February 19, 1931."
The foregoing statement is only half true as the record
shows without contradiction that Fewel had an understanding with the board of directors of the corporations, of which
he was a director and officer, that while the portion of the
premiums on Bullock's life insurance polieies to which the .....
corporations were entitled were to be paid to him and !:ly
him to Bullock on an indebtedness which Fewel owed to
Bullock, Fewell would be charg'ec:l on tb.e boo&s ':If tb~ corpo-
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ration with such premiums, and his account with the corporation would be adjusted when the subsequent premiums
were paid. In this regard Fewel testified:
"I was vice-president, I believe; and I spoke to themunder my obligation to Mr. Bullock that lowed him so
much money, and that I had an understanding with him that
I would take these profits, the first year's profits and give
them to him against my indebtedness, but that I would give
the renewals to them, and they could charge me back for
whatever I withdrew against my account, which was the current account.
"Q. You mean by that whenever you gave any of these
commissions to Mr. Bullock, that the brokerage firm charged
you with that money? A. They agreed to such an arrangement and we would work it out sooner or later. I explained
it was going to be a big amount of insurance and renewals;
and I was the only one in the corporation that was not drawing a sizable salary, and I thought I was entitled to something, and it had to be along this line to work it out.
"Q. Did they agree with that 1 A. They agreed with that
-Mr. Bullock understood it thoroughly.
"A. I testified that I later had an agreement with Mr.
Moore, who was attending to the life insurance end of our
corporation-I informed him. that I was heavily indebted
to Mr. Bullock; that I was to take no compensation out of
the company; that he and Mr. Devlin were drawing good
salaries; that Mr. Bullock felt that I should get something
out of it and pay him on account of what lowed him; and
I thought we should have some kind of understanding with
them whereby I could return those first year's premiums to
Mr. Bullock, to credit my account; they would get the renewals, and eventually they could charge the amount I gave
Mr. Bullock and eventually we would wipe it out on other
commissions we wrote.
"Q. When did you have the understanding with Moore,
Fewel & Company? A. The first time I talked it over, I
think, was with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dawes; and they said
they could not agree on it until we had a board of directors'
meeting; and I talked to the boys in the board of directors'
meeting one day and they agreed that that was fair enough."
The only conclusion which one can draw from the foregoing testimony is that whatever service Fewel rendered in
17 O. (2d)-4
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connection with the performance of the agreement between
himself and Pratt of July 10, 1928, was rendered and per. formed by him as an officer and director of the corporations
to which said contract had been assigned. 1'hese corporations were licensed as insurance brokers at the time all of
the insurance policies were issued to Bullock and at the time
the premiums became due thereon with the exception of
two 6f said policies hereinafter mentioned. In view of the
findings of the trial court, which are amply supported by
substantial evidence in the record, the facts of this case do
not warrant the application of the rule enunciated in the
cases of Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185 [88 Pac. 825, 11 Ann.
Cas. 661, 12 L'. R. A. (N. S.) 575], and La Rosa v. Glaze,
18 Cal. App. (2d) 354 [63 Pac. (2d) 1181], relied upon
in the majority opinion.
The leading case of Levinson v. Boas, supra, involved a
pawn broker who was operating a pawn shop in violation
of the law. The court stated in its opinion: "The respondent, neither at the time of making loans or at any time, had
a license to carryon or conduct the business of pawn broker."
Likewise, in the case of La Rosa v. Glaze, supra, the plaintiff in that action never at any time had a license as agent, .
commission merchant, or dealer in farm products, as required by section 1263 of the Agricultural Code.
n has been uniformly held that an unlicensed person is
not precluded from recovering a commission, if he had such
license at the time the contract was performed and the cause
of action arose, although the contract under which he seeks
to recover commissions may have been executed prior to the
time he was licensed. (Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App.
267 [200 Pac. 55]; Radich v. Oernokus, 65 Cal. App. 452
[224 Pac. 124] ; Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal. App. 414 [262
Pac. 400].)
In each of the above-mentioned cases, a real estate broker's
contract was involved. A contract authorizing a real estate
agent to sell real property on a commission basis had been
entered into before the agent had obtained a license pursuant to the law of this state, but a license had been obtained
by him before the sale was consummated and his right to
the commission had accrued. It is true that the court in
the Houston case predicated its opinion upon the wording
of section 20 of the act, which provide!; that 110 person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a real
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estate broker shall bring or maintain any action in the courts
of this state for collection of compensation for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in section 20 of the said
act without alleging and proving that said person was a
duly licensed real estate broker at the time the alleged cause
of action arose.
In the case of Davis v. Ohipman, 210 Cal. 609, at page 622
[293 Pac. 40), this court, in referring to the case of Houston
v. Williams, supra, said:
"In Houston v. Williams, supra, it was held that a limitation upon this rule was made by section 20 of the act,
and that the rule in all its rigor should not apply to a person
holding a broker's license at the time he consummated a
sale of real property even though he had no such license at
the time he entered into a contract with the owner to pay
him a commission. The court there held that a reasonable
construction of the act would permit such a holding. While
agreeing with the appellate court in this ruling, we are further of the opinion that it would be a most unreasonable
construction of the statute to hold that it permitted an action
to be maintained as in the present proceeding where the plaintiff had no license at the date the sale of the property was
effected, or during any of the time during which he rendered
the services for which he seeks to recover, and only secured
such a license practically a year after the sale was effected.
As plaintiff held no broker's license at the time the sale involved herein was consummated, he is not entitled to recover
compensation for his services, all of which were rendered
prior to his securing any license."
The inevitable conclusion at which one must arrive from
a reading of the above-mentioned cases is that it was the
intention of the legislature to denounce the performance of
certain acts by a person whom the law required to procure
a license before such acts can be performed. In the case of
a real estate broker, it was the sale of real estate on a commission basis; in the case of an insurance broker, it was the
solicitation or sale of insurance. In other words, it was the
doing of something in connection with the conduct of the
business of such agent or broker which constitutes a violation of the statute, instead of merely agreeing to perform
such acts at some future date, when the person performing
the same has complied with the requirements of the law with
respect to obtaining: the license.

;..
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The record conclusively shows that the respective assignee
corporations to which the agreement was transferred were
licensed insurance brokers throughout the entire time of performance under the agreement, except as hereinafter stated.
Moore, Fewel & Company was licensed from August 10, 1928,
to June 30, 1930; Moore, Fewel & Devlin, Inc., Ltd., from
July 1, 1930, to June 30, 1932; Moore, Fewel & Dawes from
July 1,1932, to October 6, 1933. On October 11, 1933, Moore,
Fewel & Dawes, Inc., Ltd., changed its corporate name to
Fewel & Dawes, Inc. There was a lapse in its license from
October 6, 1933, to November 10, 1933. Performance under
the agreement having come to an end with the death of
John G. Bullock, and respondent being a duly licensed life
insurance broker at the time of performance and at the commencement of this action, it is not material that there was
a lapse in the corporation's license from October 6, 1933, to
November 10, 1933. Moore, Fewel & Dawes was, however,
not licensed when two policies were issued February 17, 1932.
Those premiums should be eliminated from the judgment.
The agreement of July 10, 1928, was a continuing agreement or contract and there is nothing to show that such
contract was not to exist as long as Pratt procured insurance under said agreement. The evidence shows that Bullock contemplated taking out $150,000 additional insurance
at the time the written agreement was executed. Pratt had
no option to terminate the contract at will. There is no
evidence that the contract was terminated on February 19,
1931, as contended by appellant. The contract could only
be terminated by the mutual consent of· all parties. Findings number 27 and number 28 to the effect that the contract
was not terminated are supported by the evidence.
There is no merit in the contention that a proper accounting was not had between the parties. An accounting was
held and the record fails to show any prejudice to appellant
with the exception of the item of interest which was allowed.
Respondent introduced in evidence a record containing a
list of the companies, the policies and premiums and the
commissions which were earned. Appellant reserved the
right to check the correctness of this record, and to offer
evidence of any error which it might contain. The court
found that appellant was paid $23,074.29, as commissions
under the agreement, and that respondent's share of 50 per
cent thereof amounted to $11,537.14. The court also found
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that respondent's assignors had been paid by appellant on
account of its share of said commissions only the sum of $2,687.75, leaving a balance due to respondent under the agreement of $8,849.39. That finding is supported by the evidence, ex'cept as hereafter stated.
It is true that the corporate name of Moore, Fewel & Devlin was changed in 1932 to Moore, Fewel & Dawes. The
contract involved in this case was assigned to the last-mentioned corporation January 12, 1932, which was not licensed
as a broker until JUly 1, 1932. During the interval between
the date of assignment of the contract to the last-mentioned
corporation and the issuance of its broker's license, Pratt
procured two policies on the life of Bullock of $25,000 each
and two renewals of premiums, on or about February 17,
1932, from which commissions aggregating the sum of $2,146.81 were received by Pratt. While the assignor's license
was in full force during that interval, I assume that since
title to the contract was then in the name of Moore, Fewel &
Dawes, which was not then licensed as a broker, it would
not be entitled to share in such commissions. The judgment
of $8,849.39 should therefore be modified by subtracting
therefrom said sum of $2,146.81.
Findings numbers 24 and 25 with respect to the interest
allowed are not supported by the ~vidence. The record fails
to disclose the dates of payments of commissions to appellant.
At least it is impossible to determine which dates refer to
the specific times when the commissions were received by the
appellant. The record therefore fails to show that respondent is entitled to interest on unpaid commissions which were
received by the. appellant. The judgment should also be
modified by disallowing the items of interest in the sum of
$1993.30.
There is no merit whatever in appellant's contention that
the contract of JUly 10, 1928, was not assignable, or that he
could not be compelled to recognize the assignee thereof, as
the evidence is undisputed that appellant dealt with the corporate assignees of Fewel, and accepted receipts signed by
said assignees for commissions paid Fewel, pursuant to said
contract. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that even
though appellant did not contemplate contracting with the
corporate assignees of Fewel at the time he entered into said
agreement, he is, nevertheless, estopped by his conduct from
contending that the assignment of the agreement by Fewel
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terminated the contract and that the assignee acquired no
rights thereunder by virtue of the various assignments
thereof.
As I view this case, however, in view of the findings of the
trial court, I am of the opinion that the contract of July
10, 1928, was made by Fewel on behalf of the corporation
which he contemplated organizing, and the assignment thereof
by Fewel to the corporation was a mere formality and was
not essential to secure to said corporation the rights to which
it was entitled under said contract.
The evidence is sufficient to support the findings of the
trial court that said contract was made by Fewel as an
officer and agent of Moore, Fewel & Company, and was subsequently performed by him as an officer and agent of the
other corporations to which it was assigned.
Appellant has attempted to raise the proposition of res
adjudicata against the judgment recovered by respondent in
this case. This proposition is presented by way of a motion
to take additional evidence in this court, pursuant to section 956a of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The judgment which appellant contends is res adjudicata
of the judgment herein appealed from was entered Septem- ,
ber 8, 1937, approximately 15 months after the entry of the -,!
judgment in the case at bar; said judgment of September 8,
1937, arose out of the following factual situation;
About December 12, 1933, respondent levied an attachment
upon certain funds held by the executors of the estate of
John G. Bullock. After entry of judgment on June 24,
1936, no stay having been obtained by appellant, execution
was levied by the respondent against these same funds. The
executors thereupon filed an action of interpleader, and paid
the moneys into court, alleging that numerous claims had
been made thereto by various creditors of said Franklin L.
Pratt. Respondent filed an answer and cross-complaint in
this action, setting forth its claim to the interpleaded fund.
The cross-complaint sets forth and alleges a prior right to
the interpleaded fund for the reasons that, (1) The rights of
other claimants were based on certain assignments from Pratt
which constituted fraudulent conveyances, and (2) The fund
was impressed with a constructive trust therefore no assignments could be validly made by Pratt.
The court in this interpleader action found that Fewel
& Dawes, Inc., was entitled to recover said moneys sub-
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ject to the right of two other claimants, who held valid
assignments from Pratt. The court also found that the
interest of Fewel & Dawes, Inc., existed, however, only by
virtue of the levy of the writ of attachment and the subsequent levy of a writ of execution. As to the second cause
of action, which was predicated on the theory of a constructive trust in the fund for the benefit of respondent corporation, the court found that no such trust existed. The findings of fact determined that the contract of July 10, 1928,
was not made with or on behalf of Moore, Fewel & Company;
that, on the contrary the agreement was made with Richard W. Fewel and that it was void, as he was not a licensed
life insurance agent or broker at the time of said agreement,
nor at any time thereafter; that the claim for the funds in
question from the estate of John G. Bullock, deceased, was
properly made in behalf of Franklin L. Pratt. The judgment in this interpleader action was entered on November 8,
1937, and became final after time for appeal had elapsed.
Appellant sought to introduce that final judgment as evidence in this case to establish it as res adjudicata and to
create an estoppel.
I am of the opinion it was not the court's province in the
suit of interpleader to challenge the judgment upon which
execution had issned. The sole issue which was presented
to the court in that cause of action was neither involved in
nor determinative of the issues in the present suit. The
issue before the court in that action raised the question as
to whether the appellant, Pratt, was a trustee of the interpleaded fund, and as such, whether he violated his duty
as trustee by assigning that fund to various claimants. A
finding that he was not a trustee of said fund for the benefit of the respondent herein did not determine the issues
presented in this suit for an accounting. That final judgment, therefore, is not res adj1ldicata of the issues presented
in this case.
.
An examination of the cases cited by appellant fails to
disclose any precedent for the application of res adjudicata
or estoppel under the circumstances of this case.
I am forced to the conclusion, after a very careful examination of the record and briefs in this case that every consideration of equity and justice is on the side of the plaintiff and respondent in this case, and that the defendant and
appellant is attempting to evade an obligation which he con-
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tracted in good faith to perform and which he did perform
until the death of Bullock, but when he saw no further
opportunity to advance his own interests by continuing to
secure the cooperation of Fewel and his corporation, he repudiated his obligation and is now attempting to resort to
technical defenses to defeat a just obligation which he contracted in good faith, with full knowledge of all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the arrangement which he
himself made with Fewel and which the trial court found
had been faithfully executed by Fewel and his successors
in interest. To now permit the defendant to prevail under
such circumstances, will, in my opinion, result in a miscarriage of justice which should not be countenanced by any
court.
The judgment should be modified by striking therefrom
the commissions on the policies and renewals of February
17, 1932, aggregating the sum of $2,146.81, and the items of
interest allowed in the sum of $1993.30, and as so modified,
the judgment should l>e affirmed.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Supersedeas to stay all proceedings pending appeal from a judgment of the Superior
Court of Merced County. James D. Garibaldi, JUdge. Writ
denied.
Edwin H. Williams for Appellant.
George H. Johnston for Respondents.
~
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FLORA J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO
BANK & UNION TRUST COMPANY (a Banking
Corporation) et aI., Respondents.
[1] Partition-New Trial and Appeal-Appeal and Error-Deci-

sions Appealable.-Under Code of Civil Procedure, section
9£3, an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory decree in a
partition suit that determines the rights of the parties, whether
it directs partition in kind or by a sale and division of the
proceeds, and this notwithstanding the reservation until the
final decree of the allowance of attorneys' fees and costs of
suit.

1. See 20 Cal. Jur. 663; 20 R. C. L. 770.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Partition, § 72 (2); 2. Appeal and
Error, § 400; 3. Appeal and Error, § 425.
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[2] Appeal and Error-Supersedeas and Stay of ProceedingsUpon Security or Filing Notice of Appeal-Necessity of SecuritY-Particular Judgments Stayed by Cost Bonds or Taking
Appeal.-In the absence of specific provision concerning an
interlocutory judgment of partition, under Code of Civil Procedure, section 949, the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the lower court upon such a decree.
[3] ld.-Supersedeas and Stay of Proceedings-Upon Allowance
by Court or Judge on Order or Writ of Appellate CourtGrounds for Allowance or Refusal of Writ.-A petition for a
writ of supersedeas will be denied as unnecessary where the
perfecting of an appeal itself operates as a stay of proceedings in the trial court.

Curtis, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 5404.

WU,LIAMS V. WELLS FARGO BANK.

EDMONDS, J.-In a partition action brought by Flora J.
Williams, the court rendered a decree ordering the property
sold and the proceeds divided in proportion to the interest
of each party. She then appealed from that decree upon the
ground that the property should be partitioned in kind, and
now seeks a writ of supersedeas to stay all proceedings authorized by it until the decision upon her appeal.
The controversy concerns 310 acres of land, one-quarter
of which, the superior court decided, is owned by the petitioner. The remaining three-fourths was decreed to be owned
by the respondent Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Oompany, as trustee. The court further determined that the
petitioner is entitled to partition, but that as it cannot be
made in kind without great prejudice to the owners, a sale
of the property is necessary. By other provisions of the
decree the court appointed referees and directed them to
sell the land, subject to confirmation, reserving the right to
allow and apportion attorneys' fees, the expenses of sale, and
costs in a final decree.
'l.'he petitioner contends that an appeal may be taken from
an interlocutory decree which determines the rights of the

